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Ricardo Meets China, India and U.S. Three Hundred Years Later 
 
I. Introduction. 
  In a recent article, Samuelson (2004) rejects the idea that outsourcing is always 
beneficial for advanced industrialized countries whose workers are being laid off and 
replaced by others from underdeveloped countries.  He quotes prominent mainstream 
economists who are supporters of outsourcing to low-wage countries like China and 
India.  These economists claim that the job losses in America are only temporary.  For 
example, Irwin (2002, 2004) asserts that only in the short run the American workers may 
suffer; however in the long run, the labor markets forces will adjust in a way that such 
outsourcing will be beneficial for America. 
Furthermore, Bhagwati, Panagariya, and Srinivasan (2004) claim that the fears 
that offshore outsourcing will lead to high-value jobs being replaced by low-value jobs 
are implausible in view of several qualitative arguments to the contrary.  They argue that 
outsourcing leads to gains from trade.  For extensive defense in favor of globalization, 
see papers by Bhagwati (Bhagwati, 2004A, 2004B, and 2004C).  Samuelson quotes his 
own work (1972) and others (Johnson and Stafford, 1993, and Gomory and Baumol, 
2000), asserting that in a globalized world, technological improvements in 
underdeveloped countries (i.e., China and India) may harm the economic growth and the 
standard of living of workers in developed countries in the long run. 
This paper provides some rational insight into the puzzle of what may be called 
“controversial global trade.”  Using a theoretical construct of a simple Ricardian trade 
model, the paper shows that technological improvements in the East have welfare 
implications on people in both the East and the West.  The paper repeats some of the   3
scenarios used by Samuelson (2004) and subjects them to additional thought experiments.  
The effects on these scenarios are analyzed and examined.  Additionally, the scenario of a 
specialized labor force is developed.  The models are used to indicate and demonstrate 
the arguments for and against globalization. 
The findings of this paper should encourage economists who specialize in trade 
and management, as well as political economists, international business scholars, and 
policy makers to be conscious of the potential negative effects of continued outsourcing 
and globalization.  The recognition of the potential negative effects of outsourcing may 
encourage the implementation of policies that will maintain and improve the 
competitiveness of the developed Western countries.  Such an appreciation of the 
potential pitfalls of increasing outsourcing may lead to policies that call for the developed 
countries to increase investment in their own human capital and technological know-how 
so as to secure their strength and standing in the international markets. 
  In investigating the issue of the influence of technological progress on national 
welfare we follow Samuelson (2004) and rely on the well-known Ricardian (1817) 
model.  The leading international trade textbook, written by 2008 Nobel Laureate Paul 
Krugman and by Maurice Obstfeld (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009, page 48), asserts that 
the Ricardian theory is “an extremely useful tool for thinking about the reasons why trade 
may happen and about the effects of international trade on national welfare.”  They 
proceed by posing the questions:  “Is the (Ricardian) model a good fit to the real world?  
Does the Ricardian model make accurate predictions about actual international trade 
flows?”  They conclude by writing: “The basic prediction of the Ricardian model… has 
been strongly confirmed by a number of studies over the years.”
1   4
  In several models, the matter of redistribution of income between factors within a 
country is discussed in the context of international trade.  Theorems developed by 
Heckscher-Ohlin (1933), Ohlin (1933), Stolper and Samuelson (1941), and Rybczynski 
(1955) are all modeled with two factors, two goods and two countries.  For a recent 
elaboration of the Hechksher-Ohlin models and the Rybczynski theorem in the context of 
intermediate goods see for examples, Luthje (2006), in this Journal.  Luthje (2006) shows 
in a theoretical paper that the potential trade pattern becomes much more varied and 
significantly distinct from the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model.  Luthje (2006) even 
finds conditions for what he called “reversed Heckscher-Ohlin model.”
2 
The discussion above with regards to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and the 
Stolper-Samuelson (1941) and Rybczynski (1955) theorems deals with redistribution 
concerns within the countries, where one group (i.e. laborers) gains and one group (i.e. 
capitalists) loses as a result of opening the market to international trade, and vice versa 
for the other trading partner.  The model presented in this paper however, deals only with 
the distributional effects between the trading countries.  In order to make the point as 
clearly as possible, the paper refrains from the question of intra country’s distributional 
effects.  The model presented in this paper has only one factor of production and thus 
cannot be used to analyze welfare effects within countries.
3 
Consequently, we focus on this issue of welfare inequality between countries 
based on the simple Ricardian (1817) model.  This is the case of one input, Labor, where 
workers are also the consumers whose utility function is unique.  We concentrate on how 
these changes in inequality and welfare distribution may affect the advantages and 
benefits from international trade.   5
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections.  Section II presents the 
assumptions of the model and describes the benchmark case model; Section III revises 
the benchmark model to include different scenarios due to various technological 
improvements in one of the trading partner.  Section IV extends the model to handle 
population growth.  Section V concludes by presenting general implications of the model.  
 
II.  The Model 
This section introduces the assumptions and develops the basic results derived from the 
model.  The first five assumptions below follow Ricardo (1817) and Samuelson (2004).  
The sixth assumption is made for simplicity of exposition and calculation. 
Assumptions of the model: 
1.  There are only two countries in the World: the United States (a developed 
country) and China (an underdeveloped country). 
2.  The U.S. is significantly more efficient (has an absolute advantage) in the 
production of two goods, Good X and Good Y. 
3.  For each country, the total national pie is equally distributed between all working 
citizens. 
4.  Each worker is also a consumer. 
5.  The production function in both countries is linear with respect to the one input, 
labor, exhibiting constant unit costs. 
6.  The utility functions from consumption of goods X and Y identify them as full 
complement goods i.e., Ui = Min[Xi, Yi].  They are assumed to be identical for   6
each individual in both countries.  This assumption is introduced for simplicity of 
exposition and calculation. 
Based on the simplified assumptions above, we develop scenarios under which 
technological changes in one country may diminish the potential benefit of trade between 
the two trading countries.  This may cause a redistribution of welfare, affecting 
consumers in one or both countries, which may significantly reduce or even eliminate the 
benefit from international trade. 
The aim of the scenarios presented is to show the implications of the model for 
possible and reasonable values of the parameters.  The existence of such scenarios serves 
as an indicator to political economists, international business scholars, and policy makers 
of the potential danger in blindly following free trade measures as the sole available 
policy.  The particular values are chosen for simplicity and clarity of the derivation of the 
results.  The fact that this paper derives such results within a simple model is an attribute 
of this study, since it directs attention to the plausibility of such outcomes. 
Scenario 1:  The Baseline Case 
Assume that there are 10 American workers and 100 Chinese laborers.  The American 
worker can produce either 0.5 units of Good X or 1 unit of Good Y.  Based on the 
assumptions above, the Ricardian Production Possibilities Frontier (PPF), which is 
identical to the Consumptions Possibilities Frontier (CPF) in autarky, is equal to: 
 
(1)  2X + Y = 10. 
   7
The Profile of the Chinese worker is as follows:  He can produce only 0.1 units of 
Good X or 0.05 units of Good Y.  Thus, the Ricardian Production Possibilities Frontier 
for the Chinese economy is equal to: 
 
(2)  10X + 20Y = 100 
 
  Note that the American worker has an absolute advantage in producing both 
Goods X and Y.  However, an American worker has a comparative advantage in Good Y 
whereas a Chinese worker has a comparative advantage in Good X. 
Assume that the utility function of each consumer is given as: 
(3)  uA = Min [xA, yA] = uC = Min[xC, yC] 
where uA, xA and yA represent the utility and quantities consumed by an American 
consumer and uC, xC and yC represent those of a Chinese consumer. 
Under autarky, the solution is that both countries produce exactly the same 
amount of each good, i.e., XA = YA, and XC = YC.  Using the relationships in Equations 
(1) and (2) leads to the autarky solution: 
XA = 3.333, YA = 3.333, XC = 3.333 YC = 3.333. 
Point A in Figure 1 illustrates these production combinations for both the U.S.A. 
and China.  Since the total units produced of Goods X and Y are the same for both 
countries, the per capita consumption of each American consumer is ten times as much as 
his Chinese counterpart, i.e., xA = 0.333, yA = 0.333, xC = 0.0333, yC = 0.0333.  Thus, the 
utility of each consumer in the United States is 0.333, as compared to 0.0333 for the   8
Chinese consumer.  In other words, the standard of living for Americans as measured in 
per-capita units of utility is ten times that of the Chinese laborer. 
Now, assume that the two countries open their borders for free trade.  Assume no 
transportation costs. Since the two utility functions are identical, the United States 
specializes in its comparative advantage commodity, Good Y, and China specializes in 
Good X.  In this case, the World Production Possibility Frontier (PPFW) is given by the 
following equations (See Figure 1): 
 
Y = 15 – 0.5 X   for 0 < X < 10  
(4)  Y = 30 – 2 X    for 10 ≤ X < 15 
The United States produces 10 units of Good Y and China produces 10 units of 
Good X (Point O, for Open, in Figure 1). 
  Assuming the terms of trade ratio to be 1: 1, each country exports and imports one 
half of its production to each other.  Total consumption in the two countries is equal to 
XA = 5, YA = 5, XC = 5, YC = 5.  Each American laborer now consumes 0.5 units of X 
and 0.5 units of Y, and each Chinese worker consumes 0.05 of each good, X and Y.  
Thus, the standard of living for both American and Chinese workers increases by 50 
percent, as a result of opening the borders.  Note that in this example, it is still true that 
American workers are consuming ten fold more than the Chinese workers under the 
above terms of trade assumption.  It should be emphasized, however, that terms of trade 
other than 1X : 1Y, would give different ratios of relative gains. 
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III.1  Technological Change in China 
Scenario  2:  A Significant Technological Improvement in the Chinese Imported 
Commodity That Leads to a Switch in Specialization 
Assume that now China acquired a new technology that causes its citizens to 
produce Good X and Good Y as follows:  The productivity in producing Good X has not 
changed for a Chinese worker, but he is now six times more productive than before in the 
production of Good Y, i.e., he can produce 0.3 units of Good Y.  Thus, the PPF for China 
is given by the equation: 
(5)  10 X + 3.333 Y = 100,   or 
(6)  Y = 30 – 3X 
Assuming that there are no technological changes in the United States, the autarky 
equilibrium in the U.S. does not change, whereas in China the autarky equilibrium is now 
XC = YC = 7.5, thus xC= yC = 0.075 and uC=0.075. 
Under free trade, the World Production Possibilities Frontier changes to: 
Y = 40 – 2X  for 0 < X < 5   
(7)  Y = 45 – 3X   for 5 ≤ X < 15 
  Following the conditions above, the new total production by the two countries is:  
X = Y = 11.25 units (Point O”) in Figure 2.  This point is attainable by switching the 
specialization of the United States from producing Good Y to a specialization in Good X.  
In this case, the United States can produce only 5 units of Good X; the remaining 6.25 
units of Good X are now produced in China.  In addition, China produces all 11.25 units 
of Good Y.   10
  We pause for a moment and disregard the assumption of perfect competition that 
will lead to a specific terms of trade that we will discuss later.  Instead, it is assumed that 
the two countries are involved in mutual discussions and bargaining processes to 
determine the terms of trade after the technological improvements.  This scenario that one 
may call Nash (Nash, 1951), or Nash–Coase bargaining model (Coase, 1960), does 
represent the ongoing negotiations among countries at the beginning of the 21
st century.  
The competitive equilibrium will be presented later in the paper. 
Following the bargaining apparatus, suppose that the term of trade is PY/PX and is 
equal to 0.4, which is in-between the domestic, U.S.’s price ratio of 0.5, and the foreign, 
China’s price ratio of 0.333.  These price ratios are at pre-trade autarky equilibrium.  
Under this term of trade’s condition, the consumption of good Y in China is: 
 
(8) YC = 11.25 – (Y exported to the USA) = XC = 6.25 + (X imported from the 
United States), 
 
Where YC and XC are consumptions of Y and X, respectively in China, and where China 
produces 11.25 units of Y and 6.25 units of X. 
  Based on the above terms of trade, the following equation is satisfied: 
 
(9)  X imported from the U.S.  = 0.4Y exported to the United States. 
  Equations (8) and (9) imply: 
(10) YC = 11.25 – 2.5(X imported from the U.S.A.) 
= 6.25 + (X imported from the U.S.A.) = XC.   11
Thus,  
(X imported from the U.S.A.) = 1.428571 
and 
XC = YC = 7.678571 
The new per-capita utility for China, uC, is equal to: uC  = 0.076785 
  As for the Unites States,  
XA = 5 – 1.428571 = 3.571429 = YA. 
Thus, the new American’s per-capita utility is equal to 0.3571429. 
  The comparison between the American and Chinese consumer for the three cases 
- before trade, after trade, and after the technological change in China - looks as follows: 
uC after the technological improvement in China = 0.076785 > uC before 
technological change with trade = 0.05 > uC under Autarky = 0.0333. 
uA  before technological change with trade = 0.5 > uA after the technological 
improvement in China = 0.3571429 > uA under Autarky = 0.333. 
  The above results are summarized in the following claim. 
Claim 
If the globalization process leads to a transmission of technological know-how to 
less developed economies, the less developed countries will benefit even if the developed 
countries may still have an absolute technological advantage in some or all products.  
However, it is possible that it leads to a switch in specialization in the developed 
countries.  In this case, the developed country is worse off from the globalization 
situation compared to the pre-technological improvements in the underdeveloped 
country.  Still, it is beneficial for the developed country to engage in trade.   ■   12
  This claim is not only valid under the “bargaining” framework, but also under the 
competitive-equilibrium scenario when terms of trade are most favorable for the United 
States because China does not specializes whereas the United States produces only Good 
X.  Consider this competitive case, where the only terms of trade after the technological 
improvement in China is in a ratio of PY/PX that is equal to the internal price ratio in 
China, and thus equal to 0.333, i.e., the United States imports 3 units of Good Y for one 
unit of the exported Good X.  In this case: 
(10’) YC = 11.25 – 3(X imported from the U.S.A.) 
= 6.25 + (X imported from the U.S.A.) = XC. 
Thus, X imported from the United States = 1.25.  It follows that XC = 6.25 + 1.25 = 7.5, 
where 6.25 units are the Chinese production of Good X and 1.25 is the quantity of Good 
X imported from the U.S.  YC = 11.25 – 3.75 = 7.5, where 11.25 is the total production of 
Good Y in China and 3.75 is the number of units of Good Y exported to the U.S. 
The comparison between the American and Chinese consumer for the three cases 
- before trade, after trade, and after the technological change in China - now looks like 
this: 
uC after the technological improvement in China = 0.075 > uC before 
technological change with trade = 0.05 > uC under Autarky = 0.0333. 
uA before technological change with trade = 0.5 > uA after the technological 
change in China = 0.375 > uA under Autarky = 0.333. 
  The scenario described above is the best in terms of trade from the U.S. point of 
view.  Still, the technological improvement in China that leads to specialization-
switching translates to a welfare reduction for U.S. citizens.   13
The conclusion is that in the case of a technological improvement in China, which 
causes China to switch its specialization patterns, the United States faces a loss.  This 
conclusion is still valid in the extreme case, when the terms of trade before and after the 
technological improvement in China have not changed.  The Chinese do benefit in this 
case from the technological improvement, but not from the terms of trade following this 
improvement. 
One notes that the pre-technological-progress utility was calculated at the 
arbitrary 1:1 term of trade.  With some other terms of trade, the U.S. per capita utility can 
be greater after the Chinese technological progress than before the progress.  In any 
event, the United States never loses welfare compared to refraining from trade.  However, 
the point to emphasize is that this paper presents a scenario where the United States is 
worse off as a result of the China’s improved technology. 
Scenario  3:  A Small Technological Improvement in the Chinese Imported 
Commodity that does not Lead to a Switch in Specialization 
We now turn to the case where the technological improvement in China is in the 
product that China initially imported, prior to the technological improvements, which will 
not lead to changes in specialization.  This motivates China to continue importing Good 
Y from the U.S., since the U.S. still has a comparative advantage in that good.  Based on 
the assumption of 1:1 consumption which eliminates the possibility for the substitution 
effect, the new terms of trade have not changed as a result of the improvement in China.  
In this scenario, both countries will not benefit from the improvement.  The intuition is 
that since China specializes in Good X and all the improvement occurs in Good Y, which   14
China is importing anyway, neither of the countries benefit from the technological 
improvement.  Figure 3 illustrates this case. 
U.S. under Autarky:  Y = 10 – 2X 
China under Autarky:  Y = 5 – 0.5 X 
The World Under Trade:  Y = 15 – 0.5 X for 0 < X < 10, and 
Y = 30 – 2X  for 10 ≤ X < 15. 
Point O is on the intersection of the two equations above of the world under trade; 
On the 45-degree line Y = X 
China after the technological improvements: 
(11)  Y = 10 – X 
The World PPF after the technological improvements: 
  Y = 20 – X  for 0 < X < 10. 
(12)  Y = 30 – 2X  for 10 ≤ X < 15. 
  Thus, the Chinese will remain at the same place before and after trade as far as 
their consumption bundle.  Note that in case where the 1:1 assumption is not valid, a 
technological improvement in the Y industry leads to greater potential profitability in Y 
production.  Therefore, more of Good Y would be produced, its price would fall, and 
consumption substitution toward Y would occur.  This would lead to gains in trade.  
However, what is innovative in the above scenario is that it is shown that technological 
improvements do not change the welfare of the two countries at all.  Even though the 
potential improvement in technology has occurred, neither country benefited. 
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Scenario 4:  Technological Improvement in the Chinese Exported Commodity 
We turn to the case where China improves in X, a commodity that China initially 
had a comparative advantage in and thus exported to the United States.  If the terms of 
trade do not change, both countries benefit from the technological improvements. 
  Assume a technological improvement in China of 100 percent only in Good X.  In 
this case, the Chinese will have comparative advantage in Good X after the improvement 
just as it had before the improvement.  In a closed market, the PPF for China is: 
(13)  Y = 5 – 0.25X 
Since, we assume full complement goods, if XC = YC then in a closed autarky market, XC 
= 4, as compared with XC=YC = 0.333 in a closed market before the technological 
improvement. 
  The new open market world’s Production Possibilities Frontier, PPFW is: 
Y = 15 – 0.25 X     for 0 < X < 20 
(14)    Y = 50 – 2X      for 20 ≤ X < 25 
The new world’s production level moves from the point O to O’ (Figure 4).  At point O’, 
X = Y = 12.  The main question is how the total world production is allocated between 
the two countries.  One possibility that may results from a bargaining process is that the 
consumption of X and Y is divided between the two countries evenly so, XA = 
XC=YA=YC = 6.  So, uA = 0.6, uC = 0.06, representing improvement in both countries as a 
result of the technological change.  This will occur if the U.S. specializes and produces 
only 10 units of Good Y while China produces, after the improvement, 2 units of Good Y 
and 12 units of Good X.  China exports 6 units of X for 4 Units of Y.  The United States   16
under this bargaining framework, exports 4 units of Y for 6 units of X.  The terms of 
trade are thus, PX/PY = 4/6 = 0.666. 
  Alternatively, if one adopts the competitive equilibrium apparatus, i.e., if the 
terms of trade are PX/PY = 4, which is the domestic autarky price in China, the United 
States specializes in Good Y and produces 10 units of that good.  China produces 12 units 
of Good X and 2 units of Good Y.  The equation for the terms of trade is given by: 
 
(15)  Y = 15 – 0.25 X  for 0 < X ≤ 20 
and the consumption equilibrium is  Y = X. 
Thus, in this scenario, the consumption of the United States is 8 units of imported-
good X and 8 units of Y, leaving 2 units of Good Y to be exported to China.  China is left 
with 4 units of Good X and 4 units of Good Y, two units of Good X from domestic 
Chinese production, and 2 units of Good Y imported from the United States.  Each 
American citizen’s utility is thus, 
uA = 0.8 and uC = 0.04. 
The comparison between the two American and Chinese consumers for the three 
cases - before trade, after trade, and after the technological change in China - has now 
changed to:  
uC before technological improvement in China with free trade = 0.05 > uC after 
the technological improvement in China in both autarky and under free trade = 0.04 > uC 
under Autarky before technological improvements = 0.0333. 
uA after the technological improvement in China with free trade = 0.8 > uA before 
technological improvements change with trade = 0.5 > uA under Autarky = 0.333.   17
As a result of the above changes in technological improvements in China, China 
does not benefit from trade.  Moreover, relative to the pre-technological improvement in 
China, the Chinese consumer is worse off in the trade situation. However, the American 
consumer benefits from the Chinese technological improvements. 
Scenario 5:  The Case of Specific Factors in Production 
The above analysis was based on the Ricardian (1817) assumption that workers in 
each country are homogeneous, each worker can produce both goods, and each has the 
same productivity. In the following, consider the case in which factors of production are 
completely specific to a particular industry.  Each worker is able to produce only Good X 
or only Good Y, but not both commodities.  Assume that in the United States there are 
two types of workers: 8 workers specializing in producing Good Y, each producing 1 unit 
of Good Y and 2 laborers who are specializing in Good X, each producing 1 unit of Good 
X.  In China, 80 workers specialize in Good X, each producing 0.1 units of Good X, and 
20 workers specialize in Good Y, each producing 0.1 units of Y. 
Figure 5 demonstrates this case, where PRU represents the potential production of 
the U.S. and PRC represents the potential production of China.  Similar to the previous 
analysis, assume that the utility function is a fixed proportion utility function (perfect 
complement goods in a ratio of 1:1).  In Autarky, the production and consumption levels 
in the U.S. are 2 units from each good, leaving 6 American workers unemployed.  In 
China, the production and consumption are the same, i.e., 60 workers are unemployed.  
Point A (for Autarky) in Figure 5 illustrates the optimum consumption point for each of 
the countries, U.S. and China.   18
Assume that the Government distributes the national pie equally, i.e., all ten of the 
American workers either employed or not, share it, each receiving 1/10, and similarly the 
100 Chinese consumers each consume 1/100 of the product.  The utility level of an 
American consumer is given by, uA = 0.2 and a Chinese consumer by uC = 0.02. 
Assume that the two countries are again involved with some bargaining and 
negotiation discussions with regards to the terms of trade.  For simplicity, assume that 
each has the same power over its trading rival.  Under open trade, the terms of trade are 
likely to be 1:1, which would result in a PPFW given by the equation: 
(16)  Y = 10 – X  for 2 ≤ X ≤ 8 
  This leads both countries to move to point O in Figure 5, where the consumption 
of each country increases to XA= YA = XC=YC= 5.  The last result leads to full 
employment of workers in both countries.  The U.S. exports 3 units of Good Y for 3 units 
of Good X and vice versa for China.  The utility for each American after trade is thus uA 
= 0.5 and uC = 0.05. 
  Assume that China has improved its technology in the imported Good Y by 100 
percent.  The new production level in the open market situation in China is PR’C in 
Figure 5.  The new equation for PPFW is: 
 
(17)  Y = 9.333 – 0.666X   for 2 ≤ X ≤ 8. 
  
Under the new terms of trade, PY/PX = 1.5.  Assume that China leads the trade, 
indicating optimal new consumption at Point O’ where XC = YC = 5.6.  China exports 2.4 
units of X to the U.S. for 1.6 units of imported Y.  This leaves the Chinese per-capita   19
utility of uC = 0.056 which is higher than before the technological improvement, where uC 
= 0.05 which is in turn higher than in Autarky where uC = 0.02.   The United States 
follows and moves toward a new consumption bundle by exporting 1.6 units of Y for 2.4 
units of imported X (Point O” in Figure 5).  The new consumption bundle of all 
Americans is 4.4 units of Good X and 4.4 units of Good Y, leaving two American 
workers unemployed.  The per-capita American utility after the technological 
improvement in China is uA = 0.44 which is less than before the improvement where uA = 
0.5 but still higher than under autarky uA = 0.2. 
 
III.2  Propositions Regarding Technological Improvements 
The above examples are generalized in the following propositions. 
Proposition 1 
As long as the international price ratio has not changed, a technological 
improvement in China that does not change the pattern of specialization between the two 
countries will not affect the United States. 
However, it is more likely that the technological improvement that causes the 
change in specialization of China will indeed change the international price ratio.  This is 
because the improvement in the Chinese technology in previously U.S. imported goods 
reduces its dependency on imports.  China’s negotiation power may be altered by its 
reduction in the dependency of imported goods from the United States.   If so, this may 
lead to a new international price ratio that is closer to the U.S.’s autarky price ratio.  In 
turn, this would lead to an increase in China’s standard of living as a consequence of the 
increased productivity in China and a consequent decrease in the standard of living in the   20
United States.  Even without a reversal in the specialization patterns in the two countries, 
this will be the case. 
Furthermore, if the technological improvement is related to the item in which 
China has been specializing and exports to the United States, then both countries may 
benefit from opening their markets to free trade regardless of changes that may occur in 
the international price ratio. 
Proposition 2 
If the improvement in technology by China is in its previously imported good, 
such that the autarky internal price ratio is now equal to the autarky price ratio in the 
United States, then there will be no trade between the two countries.  Thus, relative to the 
pre-innovation equilibrium, the Unites States loses all the benefits of trade she had 
enjoyed prior to the Chinese innovation, while China gains from the improvement in 
technology.  This case leads to elimination of trade.  In such a case technological 
improvement is not beneficial to either country. 
Proposition 3 
A further increase in Chinese productivity of the commodity for which the United 
States previously had a relative advantage will lead to a shift in specialization in which 
each country now specializes in the product that its counterpart country previously 
specialized.  This shift in specialization leads to a reduction in the welfare of United 
States residents.  The costs to the United States may become even more damaging if 
China can favorably negotiate its terms of trade with the United States.  Moreover, even 
if the productivity of China is still lower in both products, i.e. the United States has 
maintained its absolute advantage in both goods, this proposition will be valid.  In spite   21
of the fact that the U.S. loses, trade continues to flourish, since its elimination leads to an 
even greater loss to the U.S. 
Proposition 4 
A trade between a country that is more populated and a country that is less 
populated will lead to greater benefit for the relatively less populated country.   
Furthermore, if the less populated country acquires the advantage of new negotiations 
with the weaker, more populated country, the terms of trade will be more favorable with 
respect to the stronger and less populated country.  The increase in standard of living will 
also be larger in this less populated country.  Thus, the gap between the two countries’ 
standard of living increases as a result of the technological changes. 
 
IV.  Effects of Population Growth 
In this sub-section, the effect of an increase in the population size of China is 
studied.  Although technically an increase in population is similar to an increase in 
productivity as far as the aggregate PPFs, there is a difference in per-capita levels of 
production, income and utility measures. 
  Assume there is a population growth of 50 percent in China.  This implies 50 
percent of workers as well as consumers.  In autarky, initially, the PPF for China is: 
(2)  10X + 20Y = 100 
Once the population increases: 
(2’)  10X + 20 Y = 150   22
In autarky, following Ricardo, XC = YC = 7.5 which is distributed equally among 150 
consumers, thus uC = 0.05 similar to the per-capita utility before the increase in 
population. 
  However, once markets are opened, the new PPFW is: 
  Y = 17.5 – 0.5 X  for 0 < X < 15 
(18)  Y = 40 – 2X    for 15 ≤ X < 20 
  Full complement utility functions, for consumers in both countries, requires an 
optimality condition where X = Y.  Substituting this condition into the equation above 
yields: 
  Total Production of X and Y = 11.666 in the World.  This is distributed by full 
specialization in the United States, XA = 10, and YA = 0, while China produces both 
goods, XC = 1.666, and YC = 11.666.  The U.S.’s consumption equation is given by: 
(19)  X
C
A = XA – X exported to China = 10 – X exported to China 
(20)  Y
C





A  are the consumption of Good X and Good Y, respectively by the 
U.S. 
  Similarly the Chinese consumption of Goods X and Y are equal to: 
(21) X
C
C = XC + X imported from the U.S.  = 1.666 + X imported from the U.S. 
(22)  Y
C
C = YC – Y exported to the U.S. = 11.666 - Y exported to the U.S. 





A = 5, i.e., no change in the American welfare after the increase in the Chinese 




C = 6.666, which is now distributed among 150   23
consumers, thus uC after the increase in population = 0.0444 < uC before the increase in 
population = 0.05. 
  The globalization process exposes China to trade which reduces the Chinese per 
capita utility consumption as the population of China increases.  The United States is not 
affected in this example. 
The above provides some rationale to the Chinese one-child policy, which intends 
to restrain the growth of the population.  This policy, which increases the per-capita 
welfare in China and improves the benefits it might get from international trade and 
globalization, may hurt the citizens of the United States. 
 
V.  Implications and Conclusion 
  Under globalization, the United States is exposed to technological improvements 
by underdeveloped countries.  This paper shows that this trend may possibly be harmful 
to the American economy or to citizens of the industrialized West.  If technological 
changes occur in China, which alter the terms of trade in a way that leads to switching the 
imported and exported items in both countries, it may lead to different welfare 
implications for both countries and may cause harm to the developed country (such as the 
U.S.).  Yet, what we would like the reader to take from this is not that free trade may 
harm the American economy, but that the policy recommendations are in the direction of 
improving the competitiveness of the United States in particular, and the West in general. 
Improving competitiveness, a phrase that has almost disappeared in the last two 
decades from international economics textbooks, has clear and forceful micro and macro 
economic policy implications.  Microeconomic polices (maybe of macroeconomic   24
dimension) have to do with improving the quality of the labor force in the Unites States, 
investing in education, and research and development.
4  If the United States will lose its 
competitiveness in this area, we will offer our children less than we could have given 
them.  The way to compete with these newly emerging markets is by investing more in 
domestic human capital. 
According to a special report about China by BusinessWeek (December 6, 2004), 
nearly every manufacturer in the United States, from furniture makers to networking-gear 
producers, is vulnerable to Chinese competition.  Whereas China and India have long 
been known as places to cheaply produce textile-products, clothes and toys, they are now 
providing the West with other goods and services such as low cost drugs (Santini, 2004).  
Pharmaceutical companies, overwhelmed by the rising cost of creating drugs, are turning 
to China and India, where it is less expensive to conduct research and development 
(R&D) activities.  This expansion towards producing goods that are intensive in R&D is 
opening a new frontier in outsourcing. 
More drug companies have found that China and India, where doctorate-level 
scientists command a salary of only $25,000 a year (one tenth of what their colleagues in 
the West earn), are good localities to test drug compounds and their efficacy.  According 
to the China Pharmaceutical Economy Research Center, the percentage of big drug 
companies’ R&D budgets outsourced to a third party has increased from 15 percent in 
1990, to 35 percent in 1995, to 50 percent in the year 2000 (Kronholz,, 2004).  The 
market for pharmaceutical and biotechnology outsourcing was valued at $100 billion in 
2006 and is expected to reach $168 billion by 2009 (The Financial Express, 2007).
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Investing more in domestic human capital will constitute a dramatic change to the 
direction that the Unites States and other developed Western countries are currently 
headed.  According to a recent international math comparison survey, the U.S. scored 
near the bottom of the survey (Kronholz, 2004).  According to a recent Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Survey, called the Program for 
International Student Assessment, PISA, fifteen-year olds in the U.S. rank near the 
bottom of industrialized countries in both math and problem-solving skills (Kronholz, 
2004).  The U.S. is ranked 24
th among 29 countries that are members of the OECD.  
Furthermore, the percentage of top-achieving math students in the U.S. is about half that 
of other industrialized countries.  This trend, if persistent, will undermine the U.S. 
dominance in technology-related fields. 
The results of this paper do not imply that the United States should refrain from 
free trade.  The results presented do suggest that the United States needs to prepare its 
labor force for the challenges ahead in order for the U.S. to be able to compete in a more 
globalized world.  In addition, this paper, in our opinion, pinpoints the important factors 
involved in peacefully incorporating and integrating the Chinese economy with the world 
economy.  This, needless to say, is one of the most important strategic issues of the new 
millennium.  With the new Obama Administration in the U.S. and with the deepening of 
the financial and economic crisis worldwide, it is no wonder that the effects of 
globalization and outsourcing today fascinate theoretical scholars as well as the business 
community and policy makers.   26
Notes 
 
1.  Leger (1993) in this Journal uses a version of the Ricardian Model, in which an 
extra market serves as a barrier to labor movement.  The existence of this additional 
market gives rise to demands for protectionist policies.  See also, the classical work by 
MacDougall (1951), the works by Davis (1995), Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson 
(1977), Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1988), Golub and Hsieh (2000) and more recently the 
work by Gramm (2004).  Gramm, in this Journal, highlights the inappropriateness of 
using the Hechksher-Ohlin model as a short-run explanation of trade.  He incorporates 
imperfect factor mobility between two industries where reallocating inputs can be costly, 
and finds that his model performs better than the Hechksher-Ohlin framework.  Similarly, 
Hirsch and Niron, (2000) in this Journal, reject the Heckscher-Ohlin theory and use a 
simple gravity model to predict the trade potential of what they called distance-sensitive 
products to test the Arab-Israeli trade potential once peace will arrive to the region. 
2.  The empirical test of the Heckscher-Ohlin model was first performed and later 
rejected by Nobel Laureate Leontief (1953), in his famous Leontief Paradox.  Krugman 
and Obstfeld (2009) remark on the Leontief Paradox that it is the biggest piece of 
evidence against the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  These negative results are confirmed by 
later studies as well; see for example, Baldwin (1971), the extensive work by Bowen, 
Leamer and Sveikauskas (1987), and Trefler (1995).  Commenting on the work by 
Trefler (1995), Krugman and Obstfeld (2009) observe that “many trade economists now 
believe that this puzzle can be resolved only by dropping the Heckscher-Ohlin 
assumption that technologies are the same across countries” (page 75). 
3.  It is still worthwhile to note, however, following Samuelson (2004), that the 
qualitative conclusions also remain valid after adding to Ricardo’s labor-only 
technologies the post-1930 multifactor  trade models.  These models pioneered by 
Heckscher, Ohlin (1933), Viner (1923), Haberler (1985), Stolper-Samuelson (1941), 
McKenzie (2002), Jones (1971) and others, as well as earlier works by Marshall and 
Edgeworth  multifactor  trade models will reach similar results as far as inter country 
affects on national incomes.  Just as multifactor Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1980) 
nicely generalized the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1977) Ricardian labor-only 
paradigm, the qualitative results of the scenarios presented do apply as well to multifactor 
as to labor-only scenarios, in regards to the distribution of welfare between the two 
trading partners.  See Samuelson (1948, 1949, 1972a, 1972b, 1974, 1981), and 
Samuelson and Swamy (1973). 
4.  This paper shies away from macroeconomic policies, as did Samuelson (2004), 
who left his policy implications to the intellect of the readers.  One policy issue is the 
value (or, the over-value) of the dollar relative to other currencies hurting U.S.’s 
competitiveness as it tries to spring out of a recession (see, for example, Baily and 
Lawrence, 2005). 
5.  For an extensive study that examines and evaluates the determinants of the 
increase in Chinese competitiveness in the world in general and relative to other East 
Asians countries, see Adams, Gangnes and Shachmurove (2006).   27
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FIGURE ONE:  The Baseline Model 
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FIGURE THREE: Technological Improvement in the Imported Good – No 
Specialization Switching 
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FIGURE FIVE: The Case of Specific Factors in Production 
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